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I. INTRODUCTION
The widely held, if naive, hope that the passing of the Cold War would
swiftly and seamlessly lead to a peaceful, stable, and just world order had
been thoroughly dashed well before the tragedy of September 11, 2001. As
the turn of the millennium approached, the discipline imposed by opposing
superpowers on their blocs had given way to a more fluid international
system, but one still marked by frequent tension and many difficult or
intractable problems.
Today, while the fear of global nuclear holocaust between absurdly over-
armed cold warriors has subsided, nuclear conflict within particular regions
of the world is frighteningly possible. Furthermore, across the globe,
terrorism threatens as never before. Dangerously capable networks do not
merely operate across state boundaries, but gain the assistance of rogue
regimes. In terms of the sheer numbers of threats to the world order,
however, even these formidable concerns are dwarfed by extraordinarily
serious disputes and antagonisms within states-some new, others welling up
anew from ancient springs. Thus, even as the Cold War recedes into history,
civil war, domestic tyranny, national and religious rifts, and ethnic, inter-
communal, and other forms of internecine strife abound.
For our peacemakers, the number, complexity, and vicious nature of
these modem conflicts have greatly taxed, indeed perhaps even
overwhelmed, our conflict-resolution machinery. Chapter VI of the United
Nations Charter does little more than list mechanisms to promote the
peaceful settlement of disputes-negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies or
arrangements-and provide procedures for Security Council investigations
and recommendations.' Given the multitude and magnitude of the
* Director of the Muhammad Ali Institute of Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution,
University of Louisville. B.A., Dartmouth, 1982; M.A., Foreign Affairs, Virginia, 1985;
J.D., Harvard, 1986. The author is grateful for the suggestions of Julie Bunck, Inis L.
Claude, Jr., and Holly Wallace. The views expressed, however, are his alone.
I U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
peacemaking tasks that confront the international community, this dry
cataloguing of possibly useful tools may appear woefully inadequate. And
yet, pressing states to adopt any single method of dispute resolution has often
been hailed as a matter of theory, but as often has been rejected as a matter of
practice, as the largely unhappy histories of compulsory adjudication and
compulsory arbitration attest.
Beyond this, few knowledgeable onlookers would quarrel with the
proposition that in past decades the use of force toward humanitarian ends-
whether via large-scale military intervention or peacekeepers of various
stripes, whether under the U.N. flag or the flag of particular states or regional
organizations 2-has been replete with setbacks and limitations, as well as
occasional successes. Even so uncontroversial a concept as promoting the
resolution of international differences by mediation is "sometimes a fig leaf
for political inaction and policy disarray.., a means to be seen [as] doing
something while shifting responsibility and reducing the likelihood of being
blamed for policy failures. ''3
Nevertheless, the picture is by no means wholly bleak. In recent years
parties to many deep-seated disputes have arrived at settlements, sometimes
after years of negotiations, that have left their societies with real hope for
more just, stable and secure futures. Haiti, Namibia, Guatemala,
Mozambique, South Africa, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, and the Balkans
immediately spring to mind. In the course of this surge in peacemaking,
mediation and other forms of third-party intervention-some official, others
unofficial; some simultaneous, others sequential; some joint, others what
might better be termed contiguous-have often proven to be useful methods
for bringing parties toward mutually beneficial resolutions of their disputes.
Despite the importance of their deeds, however, surprisingly little is
known about how international mediators have operated, in what manner,
exactly, they have succeeded, and in what respects they have failed. In 1997,
two distinguished diplomats reported to the U.N. Secretary-General:
Information about the role of special representatives and personal envoys is
sparse because these missions typically are undertaken without publicity by
practitioners of "quiet diplomacy" who tend not to reveal what they do and
how they do it. Scholarly research and policy-relevant information has been
2 A particularly useful overview of applicable law and recent practice is MICHAEL J.
KELLY, PEACE OPERATIONS: TACKLING THE MILITARY LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES
(1997).
3 HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD 687 (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 1999).
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meager; the subject remains, in the words of one UN expert, "an academic
mystery."4
While for quite some time those who study and work in international
conflict resolution have thirsted for more scholarly and analytical
information about third-party interventions in disputes around the world, a
catalyzing event occurred in the mid-1990s. The Dayton Peace Accords
"ended a long series of mediations, marked by draining turf battles among
different third-party institutions and between the United States and the
Europeans." 5 These circumstances stimulated the United States Institute of
Peace (USIP) to initiate a project on multiparty mediation, of which the
volume under review is the chief written work product.6
II. OVERVIEW OF HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A
COMPLEX WORLD
To shed light on emerging issues in international mediation and to help
to bridge the gap between theory and practice in this rapidly developing field,
three distinguished scholar-practitioners-Chester Crocker, former U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Fen Osler Hampson,
Professor of International Affairs at Carleton University, and Pamela Aall,
Director of the USIP Education Program-have assembled a weighty
collection of essays. In one chapter of this lengthy volume they advance their
own theoretical approach to conflict, ultimately recommending a blend of
structuralist and social-psychological approaches. 7 In another, the editors
summarize the points made by the contributors at a roundtable meeting. 8 The
first, third, and final chapters are aimed at synthesizing lessons and
conclusions from the multiparty mediation project.
The heart of the book, however, is formed of case studies, contributed by
more than two dozen accomplished international mediators and chosen from
what the editors see as the three chief stages of what they call the "conflict
4 CYRUS R. VANCE & DAVID A. HAMBURG, PATHFINDERS FOR PEACE: A REPORT TO
THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ROLE OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES AND
PERSONAL ENVOYS 21-22 (1997), quoted in Paul Arthur, Multiparty Mediation in
Northern Ireland, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 469, 475.
5 Chester A. Crocker et al., Rising to the Challenge of Multiparty Mediation, in
HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 665, 665.
6 HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at xiv.
7 Chester Crocker et al., Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle, in HERDING
CATS, supra note 3, at 19, 20-29.
8 Chester A. Crocker et al., The Practitioner's Perspective, in HERDING CATS, supra
note 3, at 47, 47-62.
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cycle." 9 The cases examined span the globe-Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin
America the Middle East, the Caribbean, and the Pacific-and they illustrate
efforts to defuse potential disputes (for example, prenegotiation or preventive
diplomacy in the South China Sea), attempts to settle ongoing conflict (for
example, the Palestinian and Northern Ireland problems), and projects to help
implement existing settlements (for example, the U.N. actions in
Mozambique). To ensure that the book is reasonably accessible to those
broadly interested in international affairs but perhaps not intimately familiar
with the details of each case study, the editors insert brief background
sections before each chapter that list the major actors, the most important
dates, and the outcomes reached concerning the subject of each chapter.
Although a variety of possible improvements, detailed below, suggest
themselves, Herding Cats stands as a timely and insightful effort to better
understand the problems and prospects for the multiparty variety of
international mediation. It provides an important contribution to the dispute
resolution literature and should serve as a rich resource for scholars and
practitioners alike. Herding Cats is especially useful in opening scholarly
dialogue on multiparty mediation, an important development in international
conflict management.
By "multiparty mediation" the authors mean "attempts by many third
parties to assist peace negotiations in any given conflict." 10 The United
Nations, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States,
the Organization of African Unity, and the European Union, major states
including Japan and Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and the United
States, have been quite active in trying to bring peace to strife-torn areas. So,
too, have a host of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ranging from the
Community of Sant'Egidio, the International Crisis Group, and the Winston
Foundation for World Peace, to the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie
Corporation, the Council on Foreign Relations, and many others.
Herding Cats informs that the efforts by these many interested third
parties have taken various shapes: "simultaneous interventions by more than
one mediator in a conflict, interventions by composite actors such as regional
organizations or contact groups, as well as sequential mediated interventions
9 Crocker et al., supra note 7, at 25-27.
10 Chester Crocker et al., Introduction, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 3, 9. This
is, of course, an exceptionally broad definition of mediation, one that tends to subsume
other forms of dispute resolution. Indeed, certain of the contributors deny that their
actions properly qualify as mediation at all. For instance, Jan Egeland makes clear that, in
assisting the Palestinians and Israelis toward the Oslo Accord, Norwegians believed
themselves engaged in facilitation, not mediation. Jan Egeland, The Oslo Accord:
Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3,
at 529, 531.
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that again involve more than one party."!I Stated positively, as long-time
U.S. diplomat Harold Saunders does, "it may be fruitful to think of mediation
as itself a political process in which different actors with different capacities
perform different functions at different times."1 2 This is an important insight
since, as Saunders also points out, "citizens outside government can normally
claim no authority to negotiate while negotiators normally exhibit little
capacity to change human relationships in the larger body politic .... ",13
Other contributors perceive additional benefits. Not only can burdens and
risks be shared, but different relationships and multiple sources of leverage
can usefully be drawn upon. In considering peacemaking in southern Africa,
Chester Crocker argues that "[b]roadening the base of a mediation may
contribute directly to the creation of ... momentum and success .... [T]he
lead mediator gains the benefit of the partners' insights, relationships,
credibility, resources, diplomatic 'reach,' and political 'balance.'
Broadening, when successful, isolates the spoilers and 'rejectionists'
common to most conflict situations. '"14
At the same time, as this volume makes abundantly clear, it is a paradox
of the post-Cold War era that efforts to make peace, which from time
immemorial must rank as the most sensitive, delicate, and challenging of
diplomatic endeavors, have often been further complicated by the sheer
numbers of those who would like to help. Crocker notes, "To make such
coalitions work is complex, intricate business. The care and feeding of eager
but marginally useful partners can become a distraction. Such relationships
require a lead mediator capable of much conspicuous listening and
consulting, letting others carry the ball occasionally, and frequently sharing
credit." 15
Chief among the cardinal liabilities of multiparty mediation is the
familiar problem that too many cooks stirring the soup makes for
unappetizing fare. Not only must substantial resources be devoted to
communicating among the intervenors, and even mediating among them as
they contest their proper roles and, perhaps, the ultimate credit and blame for
their actions, but mediators who lack a common recipe can easily undermine
one another or work at cross-purposes. In a sequential mediation, handing a
partially completed process to a different mediator often makes for trouble.
11 Crocker et al., supra note 10, at 10.
12 Harold H. Saunders, The Multilevel Peace Process in Tajikstan, in HERDING
CATS, supra note 3, at 161, 163-64.
13 Id. at 168.
14 Chester A. Crocker, Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola
Settlement of 1988, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 211, 230-31.
15 Id. at 231.
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And, where tasks are divided among a group, the most difficult issues may be
passed along down the table to become someone else's concern.
Also on the negative side of the ledger, multiple intervenors can offer the
parties to a conflict opportunities to stall and tomanipulate the naive. Parties
confronting multiple mediators may forum or comparison shop, searching for
a sympathetic ear among various options, and lobby alternatives for the
resolution that best serves their interests. In this regard, Fabienne Hara of the
International Crisis Group went so far as to describe of her experiences in
central Africa: "Through their various international negotiators, Burundians
have discovered the potential power of the media and of international public
opinion, and have become obsessed with manipulating both. At the same
time, Burundians have intensified division among the various international
agents by underlining and exploiting their different agendas."16 For all of the
above reasons, the "profusion of actors" engaged in this new brand of
peacemaking-"peacekeeping forces, development agencies,
nongovernmental organizations ... , and lone operators"-"has often made
peacemaking efforts messy, difficult, and even chaotic." 17 Within the ranks,
private and public actors jockey for position. Special envoys typically enter a
conflict as representatives of states or organizations that have interests at
stake, interests that plainly extend well beyond the peaceful resolution of the
dispute in question. Thus, while the diplomatic, political, financial, and
military resources that states can bring to bear on a problem can be
considerable, their extracurricular agendas can blind them to opportunities
and make them difficult to channel, or even to dislodge.
Frequently, NGOs with religious, developmental, and humanitarian
focuses not only have access to decisionmakers, but also have relationships
with victims of conflict that differ considerably from those of diplomats, and
that might be used in positive ways to manage and resolve disputes. In
emphasizing their more altruistic motives, 18 and also, on occasion, by
maligning the cynical or narrow views of professional diplomats, private
institutions can gain a different sort of credibility-one untainted by the
16 Fabienne Hara, Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy, in HERDING CATS, supra
note 3, at 139, 150.
17 Crocker et al., supra note 10, at 4.
18 As one contributor observed, "[s]ingle-state mediators, however high-minded
their motives, are inevitably prone to being perceived as promoting national interests by
the suspicion-ridden parties to a conflict." Margaret J. Anstee, The United Nations in
Angola: Post-Bicesse Implementation, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 589, 593.
Another noted of the Mozambique peace process: "That none of the four mediators was
ever paid for his time and effort was perceived as a sign of serious commitment." Andrea
Bartoli, Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant 'Egidio, in
HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 247, 263.
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coercive and threatening postures that can be perceived when great powers
attempt to intercede. Thus, Columbia University professor Andrea Bartoli
argued that the Community of Sant'Egidio, a volunteer Catholic NGO deeply
involved in the Mozambique peace accord, "was able to succeed as a conduit
of negotiation because of the very weakness that made it such an unlikely
leader-its lack of international prestige and power, which prevented it from
being cast into[,] and constricted by[,] the formalities of more traditional
efforts."' 9
Within the complicated and kaleidoscopic scene of international dispute
resolution of the multiparty variety, the editors appropriately focus special
attention on the following questions:
* How are third-party interventions to be managed so that they achieve
useful goals?
* When is a dispute ready to be mediated, and when is a mediator
ready to participate?
* Which types of mediators are best suited for which types of conflicts,
or for which stages of a conflict?
* How can a mutually beneficial resolution emerge from multiple
initiatives?
* How does a mediator keep simultaneous efforts from canceling out
one another?
* How can sequential mediations best build on each other?
* What problems are associated with a "hand-off' of the conflict from
one mediator to a successor?
* What political and bureaucratic problems constrain mediators?
An overarching theme is that trying to organize third-party interventions
and multiparty mediations might be likened to herding cats. 20 The editors
summarize:
[T]he mediator faces an array of highly autonomous individuals and
organizations, such as special representatives of powerful states or of the
UN secretary-general, high-level politicians, and committed individuals
who are privately funded and accountable to no government or international
19 Bartoli, supra note 18, at 248. He continued: "Sant'Egidio helped to solve a
difficult problem by introducing and, when necessary, recruiting other players into the
process in order to create synergies-and, as a consequence, political latitude-that were
previously absent." Id.
20 Richard H. Solomon, USIP president and former Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, used the term "herding cats" to describe the diplomacy of
1990-91 leading to the Cambodia peace accords. Richard H. Solomon, Bringing Peace to
Cambodia, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 279, 299-300.
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organization. Like cats, these independent agents rarely feel an obligation,
or even a desire, to cooperate and they retain the ability to walk away from
the mediation or to launch competing initiatives. The mediator cannot force
these other third parties to cqllaborate but must persuade them to enter into
a working relationship that reinforces rather than undermines the
peacemaking mediation. 21
Herding Cats also focuses upon the context in which multiparty
mediation occurs and the particular constraints and opportunities that
mediators face. The editors emphasize that mediators naturally bring their
own peculiar advantages and disadvantages to the bargaining table,
stemming from "different kinds of resources and capabilities" and different
"notions of identity, social relationships, and historical and cultural
context .... "22 They declare:
To understand why some parties-governmental or nongovernmental-
make better mediators and are able not only to gain entry into a conflict but
also to sustain a process of negotiation, we argue that one has to look
beyond the kinds of resources and leverage these mediators bring to the
table to their status, legitimacy, and broader political relationships with the
parties concerned. 23
Notably, Herding Cats also analyzes the issues confronted by institutions
that are considering intervening in a dispute. To ensure that the Hippocratic
oath of doing no harm is fulfilled, the editors urge potential mediators to
contend with difficult questions. In what senses is the institution capable of
helping? Can it make a commitment to deal with the evident challenges, stay
the course, and do positive work? Are its methods proven or experimental,
and if the latter, what evidence exists that the method might prove beneficial?
And, when might a developing mediation pull an institution away from its
traditional roles and mission?
For well-intentioned possible intervenors, these are useful cautionary
thoughts because, as the editors point out, "the world is littered with
examples of mediators who parachute into conflict zones, only to leave as
quickly when the venture fails or funding runs out."' 24 Of course, the damage
resulting from failed interventions can be considerable, negatively affecting
lives and communities, damaging the credibility of those who come later, and
further complicating difficult predicaments.
21 Crocker et al., supra note 10, at 4.
22 Crocker et al., supra note 5, at 667.
23 Id.
24 id. at 682.
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Responding to a field sorely lacking accountability or accepted
professional ethics or standards, the book urges that multiparty mediation be
professionalized in the sense of having intervenors "think clearly and ahead
of time about coordination, commitment, representation, appropriate
institutions, leadership, and the role that they play in any given peacemaking
effort.' '25 They caution: "Before third parties decide to intervene in a conflict
arena, there ... ought to be ... some minimal obligation on their part to do
their homework, ascertain who else is already involved, reflect upon the issue
of coordination and coherence, and generally avoid complicating the local
situation."26 Most sternly, they counsel that "there is ... some obligation on
third parties to avoid simply exporting their own confusion, organizational
and fund-raising agendas, and eagerness to help, and to be seen helping, to
peoples in conflict who already have enough problems." 27
III. PARTICULAR ATTRRmuTEs OF HERDING CATS
Herding Cats markedly enriches the conflict studies literature.
Multiparty mediation is a complicated issue, and one worthy of considerably
more scholarly inquiry than the international law, international relations, and
conflict management disciplines have yet afforded it. A startling profusion of
actors has had a hand in a multitude of third-party interventions. Those
interventions have involved actions of different stripes, have occurred over
varying time periods, and have had an array of consequences. Sorting
through these efforts and finding telling contrasts and commonalities is a
most worthwhile task.
Beyond this, the editors make a handful of specific contributions that
ought to be noted, particularly since one of the greatest virtues of Herding
Cats may be to inspire others to build more extensively and systematically
upon the topics identified and insights offered in its pages.
A. Novel International Mediation Issues
Within this broad exploration of multiparty mediation, the editors highlight a
series of substantial issues that have rarely been identified and analyzed. For
instance, one understudied issue that Herding Cats takes up is the strengths
and weaknesses of mediation by an institution rather than by an individual.
Fabienne Hara's chapter on parallel diplomacy in Burundi particularly
25 Id. at 686.
26 Id. at 696.
27 Id. at 695.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
focuses on institutional mediation. 28 She explores the diverse array of NGOs
that has helped to mediate -that. -conflict and notes the usefulness of 'an
avowedly international approach. She- also examines the challenges of getting
official and private mediations :to work in tandem, whether simultaneously or
sequentially, during the various stages of the conflict cycle. 29 And, Hara
concludes, while NGOs can play a role in conflict resolution that states
cannot, they should try to do so within a larger official framework. 30
Otherwise, NGO mediators tend to fragment the international response.
Thus, when agendas diverge, multiparty mediation can hinder dispute
resolution, not further it. While some may find Hara's various conclusions
debatable, her contribution nicely illustrates one of the volume's strengths.
Particular new international mediation issues are identified, and seasoned
actors are pressed to draw lessons from their own experiences.
B. The Theory and Practice of Negotiation
Herding Cats is by no means relevant to internationalists alone. Those
engaged in many varieties of dispute resolution will doubtless find portions
of the book relevant to their own work. For example, those broadly interested
in the theory and practice of negotiation will discover notable points and
examples. We learn that, in the course of negotiating the Oslo Accord,
Yitzhak Rabin had New York lawyer Joel Singer "scrutinize every word and
meaning of the text and present hundreds of 'clarifying' questions" to the
Palestinians. 31 Alvaro de Soto's contribution on "Ending the Violent Conflict
in El Salvador, ' 32 reveals the manner in which the one-text negotiating
strategy served the Salvadoran parties. 33' Luigi Einaudi, U.S. special envoy
for the Ecuador-Peru peace process, nicely illustrates the technique of
28 Hara, supra note 16, at 139-58.
29 See id. at 147-48.
30 Id. at 152.
31 Egeland, supra note 10, at 536.
32 Alvaro de Soto, Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador, in HERDING CATS, supra
note 3, at 349, 349-385.
33 Id. at 359. De Soto defines the single negotiating text technique as consisting of
consulting with the parties on each issue and subsequently submitting a text to them,
as far as possible simultaneously, and then discussing it with each of them separately
and revising it in light of their reactions so as to narrow down differences, repeating
the exercise as many times as necessary.
Id. In the 1970s and 1980s mediators used the one-text approach to positive effect in
negotiating the Camp David accords and the Law of the Sea Convention. See id.;
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 205 (1982); ROGER FISHER ET
AL., GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 116 (2d ed. 1991).
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surmounting a stalemate by increasing the issues on the bargaining
table.343One can clearly see the effective use of a fading opportunity by the
Jimmy Carter-Sam Nunn-Colin Powell mediating team-which advertised to
the Haitian military the imminent U.S. invasion of Haiti-but one can also
see the need for flexibility in easing a deadline to accommodate an emerging
agreement. 35
C. Historical Insights
Those of a historical bent will find that Herding Cats' compilation of
case studies, replete with the insights, accounts, and reflections of
practitioners, contributes substantially to the historical record of these often
highly complicated disputes. This category encompasses not only the de Soto
piece and State Department official Daniel Serwer's article on the ill-fated
Bosnian Federation, 36 but also the analysis of the implementation of the 1992
peace agreement in Mozambique by its chief architect, Aldo Ajello, a rare
instance of relatively successful United Nations state-building. 37 Similarly,
the careful and detailed observations of Robert Pastor of the Carter Center,
and of John de Chastelain, chair of the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning for Northern Ireland, make cardinal
additions to the literature on the events in Haiti in 1994,38 and the Good
Friday Agreement of 1998, 39 respectively.
34 Einaudi wrote,
A Peruvian negotiator observed in a down moment, "The least Ecuador can accept is
more than the most Peru can give." The guarantor initiative of November 1997
sought to alter this negative dynamic by building development, integration, and
modernization into the settlement. And to sustain momentum, the guarantors always
sought agreement on some next step before adjournment of any meetings.
Liugi R. Einaudi, The Ecuador-Peru Peace Process, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at
407, 422.
35 Robert A. Pastor, More and Less Than It Seemed: The Carter-Nunn-Powell
Mediation in Haiti, 1994, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 507, 516, 522-23.
36 Daniel Serwer, A Bosnian Federation Memoir, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at
549, 549-86.
37 Aldo Ajello, Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement, in
HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 619, 619-42.
38 Pastor, supra note 36, at 507-25.
39 Arthur, supra note 4, at 471-501.
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D. International Organization
Much remains to be understood both about the -substantial and still
emerging role of NGOs in international affairs, and about what the end of the
Cold War has meant for-the operations of regional and international
organizations. Herding Cats provides yet another service by considering
how, and to what effect, state and non-state actors are now organizing the
peacemaking slice of international life.
Regional and international organizations, while often hamstrung by
inadequate funding for tasks of this sort, do have access to wealthy or
powerful states, and can provide "a multilateral-not state-based-stamp of
approval. '40 U.N. official Margaret Anstee wrote:
[The United Nations] has the advantages of being able to draw on the
collective and individual help of all its member states and of being not only
impartial but also seen as impartial. But it has the disadvantages of its
actions being based on political compromise and so often long delayed and
insufficiently decisive. Furthermore, the bureaucracy is heavy, there is
insufficient delegation to the field, and the practice of appointing many staff
on grounds of nationality and geographic representation, rather than
qualifications, is often not conducive to effective operations. In contrast,
individual countries can more easily take a decisive approach and may have
more leverage with one or the other of the parties through historical,
economic, or political connections. By the same token, however, those same
connections may expose the mediating country to charges of partiality in its
dealings .... 41
With respect to non-governmental organizations, as Fabienne Hara noted,
"NGOs have often found themselves playing almost governmental roles in
Burundi. They sit as partners at the negotiation table, promoting dialogue and
enjoying access to a wealth of resources and to the international media."'42
She added: "Overall, their comparative advantages have clearly diversified
and enriched the international system's ability to manage the Great Lakes
conflicts. But to give a private entity a diplomatic role also leads to numerous
quandaries. '43 The financial and human resources available to the NGO may
or may not equal those that a public international organization might bring to
bear. NGOs lack the economic and military leverage that major states enjoy,
40 Crocker et al., supra note 10, at 12.
41 Anstee, supra note 18, at 609.
42 Hara, supra note 16, at 142.
43 Id.
[Vol. 18:4 2003]
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
and some are uncomfortably prone to rudderless, disorganized, and
unfocused behavior.44 However, their relationships, outside funding, and
intellectual resources, including their capacity for fresh thinking, can
contribute significantly 45
One of the most important, yet understudied, roles of NGOs in conflict
resolution involves what is sometimes termed "track-two diplomacy," and
several of the chapters, most notably those on Northern Ireland 46 and the
South China Sea, 47 focus on this phenomenon. That is, in various important
disputes, apart from officials acting at their government's behest and
direction ("track-one diplomacy"), regular, though unofficial, contact is also
taking place between- representatives of conflicting parties and other
concerned onlookers. This is aimed at creating an environment more
conducive to the eventual official resolution of the conflict. Track-two
diplomacy often occurs informally, in scholarly settings, in an open problem-
solving atmosphere, with the aim of "fostering dialogue, developing ideas for
joint cooperation, and reducing tensions by placing issues once considered
taboo on the negotiating agenda .... -48 That it is largely ignored by the
media minimizes grandstanding by the participants, who also need not
concern themselves with diplomatic protocol or with drafting a steady stream
of private cables and public statements to feed the appetites of bureaucratic
and news agencies alike.
These advantages ought not to be dismissed lightly. One diplomat noted:
As a former news reporter and a strong believer in free speech and open
societies, I was struck by how disruptive the constant news coverage was at
public peace negotiations for the Middle East. As soon as the delegates
arrived in Washington or other official venues, journalists would confront
them with the more hostile comments made by the opposing side, thus
leading to even more aggressive responses.49
In the track-two setting, freed from some of the need to defend or justify
themselves, participants can focus more attention on brainstorming and
relationship-building. Arthur observed colorfully, "[T]rack-two exercises
44 Hara, supra note 16, at 139-40, 144.
45 This idea is illustrated well by the work of the Community of Sant'Egidio in
Mozambique. Bartoli, supra note 18, at 247, 247-73.
46 Arthur, supra note 4, at 471-501.
47 Hasjim Djalal & Ian Townsend-Gault, Managing Potential Conflicts in the South
China Sea: Informal Diplomacy for Conflict Prevention, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3,
at 109, 109-33.
48 Crocker et al., supra note 5, at 669.
49 Egeland, supra note 10, at 538.
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... can act as midwives to the formal negotiations." 50 Another authority
wrote:
[T]rack two diplomacy is in no Iway a substitute for official 'track one'
government-to-government or leader-to-leader contact. Rather, track two
activity is designed to assist official leaders by compensating for the
constraints imposed upon them by the psychologically. understandable need
for leaders to be, or at least be seen to be, strong, wary and indomitable in
the face of the enemy .... 51
E. Expanding the Language of International Mediation
For all of its ancient roots, the field of international mediation remains
largely unexplored by scholars. Perhaps as a consequence, its vocabulary has
remained limited and stagnant. This is attested to by the fact that the editors
feel obliged to use the single term "mediation" to cover such disparate ideas.
For instance, Herding Cats identifies, among various other concepts,
mediation with some coercive elements, mediation aimed chiefly at building
trust among the parties, and mediation in which the mediating team includes
individuals of different nationalities. In the international context, one can say
"mediation" and be describing a process aimed at conflict management,
conflict mitigation, conflict resolution, or simply some contribution to future
conflict resolution, such as the facilitation of the next round of negotiations.
An attentive reader or listener, even while cued to the "mediation" context,
could be picturing, with perfect justification, any of the following: shuttle
diplomacy, back channel contacts, walks in the woods, or even problem-
solving fora.
Just as most languages differentiate among a host of forms of
precipitation-mist, drizzle, downpour, sleet, hail, and snow, for instance-
so one can readily imagine a much richer terminology for such different
varieties of mediation. In this respect, Herding Cats coins certain useful
terms that may have lasting prominence. To take one example, Harold
Saunders writes of "circum-negotiation" as "the tasks apart from negotiation
that have the purpose of beginning, sustaining, and nourishing a process by
changing relationships and paving the way for negotiation or other peaceful
steps to resolve conflict,' 52 in which third-party intervenors play the roles of
50 Arthur, supra note 4, at 478.
51 JOE MONTVILLE, TRACK Two DIPLOMACY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-
GOVERNMENTAL PEACE PROMOTING RELATIONSHIPS 1 (1986), quoted in Arthur, supra
note 4, at 487.
52 Crocker et al., supra note 10, at 8.
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"instigator, communicator, persuader, organizer, precipitator, legitimizer,
con ,enor, ioderator, manager, funder, teacher, idea formulator. '53
IV. A FEW SHORTCOMINGS
Potential readers will also be interested in noting what the book does not
attempt to do or particularly distinguish itself in doing.
A. Not a Definitive Theoretical Work
While Herding Cats is a seminal contribution to a dispute resolution sub-
field still in the very early stages of development, it is too eclectic in its
sources and too uncertain in its theorizing to-be regarded as the definitive
theoretical work on international mediation. The editors correctly claim that
"the practitioner accounts in this volume are highly suggestive about the rich
mix of ingredients that go into a negotiated settlement." 54 However, for all
the wealth of description and analysis in the case studies, the book is
markedly thinner in its theoretical contributions.
1. Particular Theoretical Flaws
Much of the theoretical essence of the book is found in the second
chapter. There, the editors lay out the structuralist and social-psychological
paradigms. While these sections are not without points of interest, the editors
themselves concede that couching the issue of what third parties can do in a
conflict in these terms is "oversimplified. '55 Then, rather than building upon
the case studies to create their own theoretical scheme, the editors opt merely
to synthesize the existing paradigms, an effort that then seems to trail off in
an account of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. To the extent that the
editors aim to build a lasting theoretical model for multiparty mediation, their
attempt is, at best, fragmented.
Those who theorize about international relations pose unresolved issues
about a subject and then advance hypotheses grounded in evidence
53 Id. at 16 n.26. Herding Cats also fills out and popularizes other worthwhile
notions, such as the idea that between track-one and track-two diplomacy one sometimes
finds "track-one-and-a-half," defined as "nonofficial organizations acting with the
blessing and tacit or open support of the track-one--or the official--effort." Id. at 12.
54 Crocker et al., supra note 5, at 684.
55 Crocker et al., supra note 11, at 19, 20.
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purporting to explain observed or anticipated behavior.56 Part of theorizing
thus involves searching for common ground among disparate pieces of
evidence and competing hypothetical 'claims. Here,, in locating common
denominators, the editors have done a satisfactory job.
However, another important aspect of formulating valuable theory
involves carefully considering tensions and contradictions in the evidence,
discriminating among the unalike, and crafting the emerging theory so as to
take. such differences into account. In this respect, Herding Cats does not
especially distinguish itself. Consequently, its effort to extrapolate general
theory from the very different circumstances found in the case studies
ultimately falls short.
The fact that the book had its genesis in a multiparty mediation project
may well have influenced its theoretical shortcomings. The USIP asked two-
dozen practitioners to reflect on their experiences, to try to draw useful rules
of thumb from them, and to come together to discuss their conclusions. The
editors then devoted considerable space to summarizing and synthesizing the
participants' varied analyses. Noticeably, however, the editors seldom, if
ever, contradicted or took issue with any of the contributors' points.
A stronger theory of multiparty mediation might have been constructed
had the editors taken the separate case studies and the sometimes clashing
conclusions of the contributors, compared them rigorously and critically, and
tried to construct a theoretical model that took into account the differences in
the participants' experiences and the tensions in their diverse
recommendations. Perhaps if that had been done, when a multiparty
mediation problem arose, one would be able to look back to an integrated
theoretical model-the Herding Cats contribution to third-party intervention
theory-to provide guidance with respect to what actions to take.
2. Primacy or Complementarity in Leadership
To illustrate the theoretical flaws, one might consider first the
fundamental question "what advice might best be given to one poised to
enter a multiparty mediation?" Even here, few, if any, answers have yet
swept the field of opposition, not least within the pages of this volume.
One kernel of conventional wisdom might be that for every multiparty
mediation a lead authority ought to be designated. For example, Canadian
Ambassador Raymond Chretien reacted to the proliferation of mediators in
the 1996 Eastern Zaire crisis by distancing himself from others. He withheld
acceptance of his United Nations-sponsored mission until U.N. Secretary-
56 See MICHAEL R. FOWLER & JULIE M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE 10 (1995).
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General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had declared that Chretien's efforts would be
preeminent, and Chretien then worked diligently to separate his efforts from
others in the minds of influential media.and public and private actors. 57 On
this issue Margaret Anstee likewise concluded,. "Multiparty mediation can' be
helpful, provided it shares the same, objectives and serves to harness
supporting forces that otherwise would not be available to the peace
process." 58 Even more dogmatically, USIP. official Paul. Hare wrote,
"Regardless of the precise form it takes, it is critical that, whoever the
mediator or mediators are, a clear and single source of leadership and
direction is recognized. When there are too many would-be peacemakers, the
result will be chaos and failure."'59 Alvaro de Soto, U.N. Assistant Secretary-
General for Political Affairs, likewise declared: "It is inherent in good
mediation that there should be one agent unquestionably and unequivocally
in charge."'60
And yet, just as this hypothesis is establishing itself in our minds, we
learn from Harold Saunders that the "multilevel peace process" in Tajikstan,
the poorest of the former Soviet republics, focused on complementarity,
rather than primacy. 61 That is, once ground rules and a division of labor were
established, multiple peacemakers interacted in Tajikstan without designating
a pecking order. Instead, a joint American-Russian management team came
together and formulated a "Framework for an NGO Strategy in Tajikstan. ' 62
Thereafter, the Inter-Tajik dialogue helped NGOs define key problems on
which to work. And, an official and a public peace process coexisted
comfortably, gaining strength from one another. 63 Saunders concluded:
[T]he concept of the multilevel peace process and the experience of the
Inter-Tajik Dialogue seemed to provide at least tentative evidence that
57 See Gordon Smith & John Hay, Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire, in
HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 87, 92-93.
58 Anstee, supra note 18, at 611.
59 Paul J. Hare, Angola: The Lusaka Peace Process, in HERDING CATS, supra note 3.
at 645, 658.
60 De Soto, supra note 32, at 357.
61 See Saunders, supra note 12, at 176.
62 Id. at 162. Saunders wrote:
The purpose of this effort was to encourage even those organizations engaged in
straightforward humanitarian work to recognize that their prescribed tasks of
sustaining or rebuilding a society tom apart by civil war could include an additional
dimension of helping the people of Tajikstan develop new interactions and build
new institutions that would eventually constitute a civil structure of peace.
Id. at 162-63.
63 Id. at 177.
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multiple leaders at different levels in a multilevel peace process can
strengthen that process if (1) they are conscious of the potential interaction
across levels of the process and (2) they are careful to recognize what must
be done at each level and what is not possible at each level. Far from
diluting overall responsibility, the concept of the multilevel peace process
provides an opportunity to enhance responsibility for the process by
creating a consciousness of what is going on in building a whole body
politic. 6
4
The differing approaches taken by Saunders and other contributors to the
issue of primacy versus complementarity exemplify the opportunities the
editors were afforded to extrapolate new theoretical contributions from all
the new evidence presented. Questions linger about whether the choice of
primacy or complementarity should depend upon the phase of the conflict,
the identity of the potential mediators, the characteristics of the dispute, or
some other factor or combination of factors Enough opportunities to tackle
those sorts of questions were missed that one does not in the end close
Herding Cats and marvel at the dazzling theoretical insights it offers.
3. Ripeness and the Conflict Cycle
That the contributors, trying to arrive at general truths from their
experiences in very different circumstances, are by no means of one mind on
a host of fundamental matters strongly suggests that further study is in order.
It underscored for this reader a certain skepticism about the rules of thumb
offered in the pages of Herding Cats. Much of the counsel offered might best
be viewed as initial suggestions, or working hypotheses, and might best be
automatically subjected to critical scrutiny, if only to reduce to scale unduly
broad generalizations. For example, a central issue with which the editors
and various contributors contend is whether conflicts can be resolved only
after they reach a particular stage. By analogy, are conflicts like fruit, ripe to
be picked only at a certain period of their development?65 Or, in the
alternative, are they more like a disease that is susceptible to a cure whenever
the problem is correctly diagnosed and the proper medicine is applied?
Perhaps the answer depends upon the conflict.
Alvaro de Soto, formerly the U.N. Secretary-General's representative to
the Central American peace process, found that the notion of ripeness helped
to explain how the parties in El Salvador were finally able to end violent
conflict. In his view, a military deadlock led to a "mutually hurting
64 Id. at 178.
65 This approach follows the work of I. William Zartman. See generally RIPE FOR
RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1989).
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stalemate" and a growing realization on the part of the participants in the
civil war, and their supporters, that negotiations were the only feasible route
to ending the country's pain.66 Similarly, John de Chastelain related the
Good Friday Agreement to a "yearning for peace in Northern Ireland, born of
weariness and desperation, that was ready for exploitation by the
governments, the parties, and the people."67 And yet, as Professor Bartoli
argued, "The very concept of 'ripeness' can be used in a tautological way.
The only way to say for sure that a conflict is ripe for resolution is when it
happens .... "68 He continued:
In the debate over timeliness, we tend to underestimate the power of the
mediation itself-the transforming power of the experience of adversaries
talking with one another and with others in a setting that is conducive to
constructive dialogue. Therefore, it is probably more useful to say that
violent conflicts are always ripe to end. At least we should always perceive
them as such, thereby helping those involved[,] and who have the power to
stop the killings[,] share this perspective. 69
Rather than identifying such points of tension or disagreement among the
contributors and then offering their own clarifying suggestions gleaned from
the combination of their academic and practical expertise, the editors opt,
more often than not, to focus on the simpler task of searching for common
ground among the participants.
4. Overstatements
The distinguished international relations theorist Inis L. Claude, Jr. once
observed: "Most people are addicted to the overstatement of their favorite
propositions, the exaggeration of the scope of their generalizations. We say
'always' when we mean 'sometimes,' and 'certainly' when we mean
66 De Soto, supra note 32, at 356.
67 John de Chastelain, The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, in HERDING
CATS, supra note 3, at 435, 465. Paul Arthur likewise noted of the situation in Northern
Ireland, "The momentum of events and dialogues after 1990 illustrate that a 'hurting
stalemate' had created the 'ripe moment' for intervention." Arthur, supra note 4, at 486.
Arthur, however, went on to cite approvingly the thesis that in Northern Ireland the "ripe
moment" might best be considered "a process rather than a specific point of time." Id.
(quoting Kirsten E. Schulze, The Northern Ireland Political Process, IRISH POLITICAL
STUDIES 104 (1997)).
68 Bartoli, supra note 19, at 249-50.
69 Id. at 250.
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'perhaps'; we tend to convert conditional thoughts into absolute standards." 70
Various of the contributors might fairly be charged with this type of
overgeneralization. For instance, with reference to the Northern Ireland
context, Paul Arthur first made the factual statement: "Where there is intense
and protracted communal conflict, moderates will often attempt to build
relationships with moderates on the other side of the divide, to bridge the
gap, and to develop a 'centering' dynamic." 71 From this observation,
however, he drew the broad and questionable conclusion that "[t]his
'negotiating middle' or 'strong center' is required for peace processes to take
hold."72
Similarly, while developing goodwill among the parties plainly helps to
bring about a durable solution to a deep-seated conflict, many would be quite
hesitant to declare, as Max Van Der Stoel, High Commissioner on National
Minorities for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) does, that no lasting solution is possible without "a sufficient
measure of goodwill. '73 Indeed, Alvaro de Soto's chapter "Ending Violent
Conflict in El Salvador" itself may refute Van Der Stoel's point since the
Salvadoran protagonists were so lacking in goodwill that "no give-and-take
ever took place between the negotiators sitting face to face." 74
In another passage that may smack of overgeneralization, Van Der Stoel
stated:
The sooner third-party conflict prevention is initiated, the greater the chance
that the dispute will not reach a high level of tension and that the parties
may still be willing (and politically able) to find compromises and
accommodate each other's demands. Early action, that is, action taken
70 Inis L. Claude, Jr., The Tension Between Principle and Pragmatism in
International Relations 19 REV. INT'L STUD. 215, 219 (1993), quoted in FOWLER &
BUNCK, supra note 56, at 38 n.21 (1995).
71 Arthur, supra note 4, at 484. Arthur cites for this proposition Roger Fisher,
Negotiating Inside Out: What Are the Best Ways to Relate Internal Negotiations with
External Ones?, 5 NEGOT. J. 33 (1989).
72 Arthur, supra note 4, at 484.
73 Crocker et al., supra note 12, at 47, 50. See also the three elements purportedly
"essential for the effective functioning of any instrument of conflict prevention." Max
van der Stoel, The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner in Conflict Prevention, in
HERDING CATS, supra note 3, at 67, 68-69. Again, these may be important in the OSCE
context, but whether they apply equally to conflict resolution in other contexts might be
doubted.
74 De Soto, supra note 32, at 360.
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before tensions become acute or political positions have .been staked, is
much more likely to be welcomed by all parties concerned. 75
Some pages later, however, Harold Saunders noted, "Many deep-rooted
human conflicts in their early stages are not ready for formal mediation or
negotiation .... The focus in this period is on changing relationships. 76
Later, Saunders explained that fruitful nonofficial dialogues often progress
"from the first efforts to establish contact through a deepening and changing
of relationships to joint design of actions to change relationships in the larger
body politic."77 And, if ceasefires are negotiated at high levels, without close
connection to powerful groups with local interests at stake, they are not likely
to withstand the test of time. Hence, he argues, the need often exists for a
multilevel peace process operative among different groups with diverse
perspectives on and stakes in the conflict.78
The editors allow such contrasting views to counter one another, but they
do not themselves comment upon any overgeneralizations they may have
perceived in the chapters they compiled.
B. Lack of Attention to Mediation Techniques
Even more surprisingly, the editors give relatively little attention to
particular techniques of mediation. Not only is the book no hands-on primer
or working guide for mediators,79 but the editors seem to find considerably
more significance in the context of the mediation-matters of timing,
relationships, and leverage-than in what the mediators actually did in their
sessions with the parties. While the editors bow here and there to the
"personal skills" and distinctive styles (or "leadership techniques") of this or
that mediator,80 they deliver surprisingly little tactical or strategic guidance
on how to best mediate an international dispute. The analytical portions of
the book focus largely on the institutional and procedural aspects of
managing and resolving conflict, as opposed to the approaches actually
employed by each individual mediator at the bargaining table.
75 Van der Stoel, supra note 73, at 70.
76 Saunders, supra note 12, at 163.
77 Id. at 166.
78 See Saunders, supra note 12, at 161-79.
79 The Harvard Negotiation Project has published ROGER FISHER, INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION: A WORKING GUIDE (1978); however, this set of highly useful, but generic,
suggestions might have been supplemented by Herding Cats had the editors chosen to
focus more attention on mediation techniques.
80 Crocker et al., supra note 5, at 697.
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C. Structural Shortcomings
Concise, Herding Cats is assuredly not. The editors have done a
marvelous job at both identifying a fascinating array of recent disputes and at
marshaling the services of intelligent and informed participants to comment
upon them. No one will hail them, however, for presenting the subject
succinctly. Indeed, even their own concluding chapter, 665 pages into the
book, is plagued by unnecessarily repetitive points.
As one might expect from such an elephantine volume, the reader will
doubtless find some of the twenty-one case studies to be more useful and
interesting than others. Beyond even matters related to the eye of the
beholder, however, the studies are uneven in analytical focus. For instance,
those familiar with former U.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative
to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke's memoirs on the Balkan conflict"1
will find that his chapter ("The Road to Sarajevo") simply excerpts that
book's first chapter. Consequently, its tenor differs strikingly from that of the
other contributions, most of which pay close attention to the project's central
purpose: to draw useful conclusions about multiparty mediation from the
relevant case studies.
In addition, within the principal subsections of the book, the editorial
logic with respect to how the case studies were ordered was difficult to
discern. The very first selection, by Max Van Der Stoel, provided an
overview of the OSCE's conflict resolution work.82 However, not only did
this chapter fail to investigate any particular OSCE intervention in any detail,
but it devoted considerable space to justifying the operational decisions made
by the Office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities, rather than
exploring and improving ideas about the practice of multiparty mediation.
This first case study would have been more representative of the rest of the
book had Van Der Stoel devoted more thought and space to critical and
creative analysis of a particularly interesting third-party intervention in which
the OSCE had played a leading part.
V. CONCLUSION
Herding Cats is an important effort to improve peacemaking through the
scholarly tasks of compiling and critically analyzing information. And, given
the complexities of modern life and the age-old puzzles of international
relations, penetrating analyses are needed every bit as much as, and perhaps
even more than, new peacemaking organizations and initiatives.
81 RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR (1998).
82 Van der Stoel, supra note 73, at 67-83.
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Certainly, in a world as torn by strife as ours, plenty of work in
promoting peace remains to be done. Herding Cats delves below the surface,
showing us, for instance, that influential people-and not simply terrorists
and arms dealers-either have a stake in continued conflict or deep-seated
suspicions that peace will destroy their hopes or ambitions. In this regard Jan
Egeland observed:
In the ten conflict resolution efforts in which I have been involved, all the
leaders at all times claimed their goal was 'to end the suffering of our
peoples.' In reality, there were always influential political, military, or
economic warlords who had their personal and professional interests tied to
continued conflict. For a general or a guerrilla leader, peace can be a very
scary prospect: demobilization, early retirement, alienation, and,
increasingly, investigation for possible war crimes. For the political wartime
leader, peace may mean democratic elections that often bring in a new
generation of leadership. 83
Several of the commentators focus on the need to trim one's sails to adapt to
such realities. For instance, Aldo Ajello wrote of the U.N. experience in
Mozambique, where forces were successfully demobilized and reintegrated
into civilian life:
I spent countless, precious hours trying to persuade [World Food Program]
officials that, whether fair or not, the food requirements of a soldier armed
with an AK-47 ... are greater than those of an unarmed refugee. I was
guided less by the need to be fair than by the urgency to consolidate the
peace process and prevent slippage. 84
He continued, "[g]enerally speaking, in the cultures of development and
humanitarian aid, priority goes to the most needy and vulnerable groups. By
contrast, in a peacekeeping operation, priority should be given to the most
dangerous groups, which tend to be the least needy and least vulnerable." 85
Keeping in mind the need to wean people from their dependence on war has
wide-ranging repercussions for peacemakers charged with crafting policy in
strife-torn circumstances. In reflecting on the errors made by the international
community in Angola, U.N. official Margaret Anstee wrote:
83 Egeland, supra note 10, at 544. Paul Hare likewise wrote of the fundamental
psychological problem: "UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]
had been founded as an armed liberation movement, and its soldiers had known no other
way of life but to bear arms in the bush. Giving up their weapons conveyed a sense of
surrender and shame." Hare, supra note 59, at 653.
84 Ajello, supra note 37, at 630.
85 Id
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If elections are to be held, they should never take place until conditions are
ripe, especially as concerns demilitarization of the conflicting parties, and
should never be based on a 'winner-take-all' formula. The losers must also
have a stake in the future stability and prosperity of the country through a
judicious system of power sharing. There must be confidence-building
measures, especially in the development of sound democratic and judicial
systems and a neutral police force; in the field of human rights; through
economic and social measures fostering the reintegration of men who have
known nothing but fighting by programs of vocational training and job
creation; and by much greater involvement of local communities, most
especially of women, in the peace process. That requires commitment and
funding on the part of the international community in areas previously often
neglected. 86
Certainly, the manifold problems of the aftermath of peace settlements
remain tremendously worrisome. Professor Robert Rothstein of Colgate
University once perceptively noted that a "peace agreement is merely one
element of a larger peace process, an element that may create some new
opportunities but hardly alters all aspects of the conflict."'87 Not only must
supportive constituencies be nurtured within the society, but basic skills of
negotiation and communication must often be fostered, particularly within
influential elites.
Unfortunately, governments and organizations tend to exhibit quite short
attention spans with respect to societies attempting to heal themselves. The
post-Cold War era may well be remembered not only for the positive
advances in the theory and practice of international mediation, but for
striking problems of durability given the limited resources the international
community dedicates to helping to develop peaceful societies once fighting
has stopped. 88
In closing, one might observe that Herding Cats underscores certain
striking changes that have been wrought in international relations. Once
conflict far from the major Asian, European, and North American population
centers attracted a paucity of outside attention, concern, and resources. Then,
during the Cold War, conflicts in the developing world frequently became
86 Anstee, supra note 18, at 607-08.
87 ROBERT ROTHSTEIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECONCILIATION 3 (n.d.),
quoted in Arthur, supra note 4, at 483-84.
88 As Richard Solomon observed:
One of the prices of peace building in the post-Cold War world is sustained
international action in support of a conflict resolution process. The costs of such
actions are usually far less than a return to warfare, yet mustering the international
political will for such follow-through is a major challenge.
Solomon, supra note 20, at 314.
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embroiled in the superpower rivalry. This tended not only to distort local and
regional problems, but to make them even more intractable.
By contrast, these days various conflicts seem almost overwhelmed by
concerned outsiders, all eager to try to bring peace to troubled lands. As one
of the contributors noted caustically, members of the international
community sometimes seem to view particular disputes as experimental
laboratories in which new conflict resolution theories may be tested. 89
Indeed, while the plethora of third-party interventions has surely enriched
creative problem-solving, it has also led to questionable and often
contentious behavior among even the best-intentioned intervenors.
In the final analysis, however, multiple intervenors in a conflict seem to
have become a fact of life in the post-Cold War era. They can be potentially
beneficial in their ability to bring different approaches and pressures to bear
on difficult problems, and they can be potentially disadvantageous insofar as
they greatly complicate the question of who is in charge. However, in a
world in which, as another contributor pointed out, "changes in military
technology have enormously raised the risks and costs of conflict even
among forces armed only with conventional weapons," 90 the drawbacks of
too much attention are doubtless to be preferred to those associated with
neglect.
From such a perspective, Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and
Pamela Aall have compiled a timely and instructive book about an
enormously important subject. While it does not often provide the final
answer, Herding Cats does succeed in shining the spotlight of scholarly
attention on crucially important emerging questions. What measures might
keep multiple initiatives from pulling in different directions? How is success
to be measured in this field, and in what ways might the international
community encourage the more successful, assist the less helpful, and
restrain the unhelpful? Certainly, Herding Cats contributes markedly to the
breadth of our understanding of the different roles that multiple peacemakers
are assuming in international affairs. It may well come to be viewed as a
foundational work in a singularly significant field, the groundwork upon
which future generations of scholars and practitioners will build their own
valuable contributions.
89 Hara, supra note 16, at 142.
90 Einaudi, supra note 34, at 423.
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